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Summary of Social and Economic Impacts 
Liquor retailing in British Columbia is largely controlled by the Province of British 
Columbia. Recent changes in the past five years have allowed additional private liquor 
retailers to co-exist with government run liquor retail stores. Political, union, and pro-
privatization lobbying have all had effects on sales and liquor distribution. Private liquor 
stores and government liquor stores may sell the same products but that is as far as the 
similarities go. The public and private sector differ greatly in regards to product selection, 
price, employment and regulations. Currently the private sector follows archaic 
regulations while the British Columbia government run stores continue to expand in size 
and location. The private sector sits idle bound in red tape by issues such as limited 
locations for operation, size constraints, high product cost and political influence. 
The general public is unaware of the differences between public and private liquor 
retailing and need to be made aware of the social and economic effects of public and 
private retailing. The provincial government and union lobbyists justify the government's 
existence in the liquor market by citing issues such as health hazards and drunk driving. 
This government control generates a sizable income in the neighbourhood of $2.25 
billion dollars per year for the province. 
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Privatization of liquor retailing m British Columbia may have its advantages to 
consumers due to convemence, product selection and pnce. Many supporters of 
privatization compare British Columbia to Alberta' s experience with privatization which 
occurred in 1993. The Alberta government showed that under privatization the social and 
economic effects of privatizing liquor retailing are minimal, if any. Various consumer 
groups and research groups will argue that privatization has hurt Alberta due to increased 
social costs and lost provincially collected revenue. The health, safety and financial 
arguments can be discredited and addressed in the private sector by government programs 
such as enforcement, licensing, taxation and education which coincides with what a 
government's agenda should be. The reality is that full privatization of the liquor industry 
within British Columbia is very unlikely. One can only assume that the British Columbia 
government will continue its current monopolistic approach to liquor retailing while 
closing its small revenue producing stores and amalgamating these smaller stores into 
large government stores. The most likely scenario is that private stores will compete 
directly with government stores given the current direction of British Columbia' s Liquor 
Distribution Branch. 
It is impossible to determine if increases in product cost, cnme abuse and impaired 
driving are a direct result from an increase in privately run stores or the increase in the 
expansion of government run stores. What is quantifiable is that provincial liquor 
revenues are on the rise and continued changes to liquor retailing in British Columbia are 
evident. 
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Introduction 
In July 2002 the British Columbia government released its plans to close and replace 
British Columbia government controlled liquor stores with privately owned retail stores. 
Five years have past since the July 2002 announcement. A small handful of government 
controlled stores have closed and private stores have increased exponentially. The 
province' s new liquor retail model was similar to the Alberta Government' s 1993 liquor 
privatization model. Today, the industry in British Columbia has become fragmented due 
to provincial mismanagement, union lobbying and unclear zoning and licensing. At 
present there exits a large government monopoly competing with free market 
entrepreneurs. The question behind this literature review and paper is whether or not the 
British Columbia government should remain involved in the sale and distribution of 
liquor within the Province of British Columbia. To fully understand the current state of 
British Columbia' s liquor retail and distribution model I will commence with the history 
of retail liquor sales in British Columbia followed by a review of numerous policy and 
position papers for and against the privatization of liquor retailing. British Columbians 
need to be made aware of the differences between public and private liquor retailing in 
British Columbia to determine if government control of liquor retailing is still warranted. 
CHAPTER ONE - Evolution of British Columbia Liquor Retailing 
The Early Years 1916-1983 
Liquor retailing in British Columbia was not controlled by the province until 1916. In 
that year a referendum was held which resulted in legislation to ban the sale and 
consumption of liquor within British Columbia. 1 As is common during prohibition, 
illegal means were used to consume and distribute liquor within British Columbia. From 
1916 to 1921 in British Columbia "criminal organizations flourished during prohibition 
which resulted in bootlegging to manufacture and distribute alcohol."2 The government 
was unable to effectively enforce prohibition legislation and ultimately was unable to 
collect revenue from the distribution and sale of the· illegal liquor. "This resulted in the 
government lifting the prohibition band with a vote of 62% to 38% in favour of ending 
prohibition. "3 As a result of the government lifting the prohibition ban a new Liquor Act 
was created. This Act gave the government control of the distribution and sale of alcohol 
in the province. "This resulted in the first government liquor store opening on June 15, 
1921. "4 From 1921 to 1983 the British Columbia government retained control over all 
liquor retailing and distribution. 
1 Mark Milke, "Ending the Prohibition on Competition." Canadian Taxpayers Federation. Pg. 7, March 
2002, http://www.taxpayer.com/pd£'BC _Liquor_ study_ March 12,2002.pdf (20 November 2006). 
2 "Dry Law Ends Today in British Columbia", New York Times, (15 June 1921). 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive free/pdf?res=9A06E4DA 163EEE3ABC4D52DFB066838A639EDE 
(13 October 2006). np. 
3 Milke, "Ending the Prohibition on Competition", 2002, Pg. 7. 
4 Ruth Dupre, Vencatachellum Desire, "Why did Canada Nationalize Liquor Sales in the 1920 ' s", HEC 
Montreal Institute of Applied Economics, Pg. 15, September 2005 . 
http: //www.isnie.org/ISNIE05/Papers05/dupre.pdf (1 0 Dec 2006). 
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The Start of Privatization 1984-2002 
Up until 2002 British Columbia residents had no other choice but to buy liquor from 
government run liquor stores. These stores operated under minimal operating hours and 
Sunday closures. An alternative to government run liquor stores had existed since 1984 -
these so called "private" stores were called "Cold Beer and Wine Stores." Until 2002 
cold beer and wine stores were restricted to carrying only cold beer and wine and no hard 
liquor was available for sale. Privately run cold beer and wine stores usually sold their 
products at higher prices than government run stores due to "cooling costs" 
(refrigeration) and high product cost. This resulted in low profit margins for private cold 
beer and wine store operators. In general , cold beer and wine stores in British Columbia 
had been thought of as a convenience store. Cold beer and wine stores made their niche 
with their operating hours which allowed the stores to operate until 11 pm at night as well 
as on Sundays when government stores were closed. Cold beer and wine stores were 
restricted in size thus limiting product selection. To qualify as an owner for a cold beer 
and wine store you had to already own a pub, bar or nightclub and the liquor store had to 
be attached or located on the same property as the pub, bar, or nightclub. The British 
Columbia Liquor Distribution Branch (BCLDB) was responsible for choosing retail 
locations, products carried and conditions of sale. The Liquor Control and Licensing 
Branch was, and remains to this day, in charge of regulations and enforcement decisions. 
The reality is that the government monitors its own. The BCLDB is the only channel for 
all alcoholic beverages enabling it to collect a markup on every product sold to private 
cold beer & wine stores, agency stores, restaurants, pubs, bars, hotels, conventions and 
weddings. 
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March 15, 2002- The Change to Increased Privatization 
In March of 2002 the Province announced plans to privatize the liquor industry in British 
Columbia within four years. The government was still to be involved in the distribution 
and storage of alcohol beverages but all retail stores would be operated privately. In 
March of 2002 the British Columbia Liberal Government extended an open invitation to 
all bar, pub and nightclub owners to apply for a retail liquor store license. The normal 
application fee was even waived in order to attract potential liquor retailers. At this time 
there were approximately 290 "Cold Beer and Wine" stores operating within the 
province. The province received hundreds of applications within the four month window 
of acceptance. Rick Thorpe, British Columbia' s Minister of Competition, Science and 
Enterprise stated in July 2002 that "selling alcohol is not a vital public service, but the 
government will continue to play an important role in enforcing regulations to protect 
public safety and in collecting revenue. "5 Further changes allowed cold beer and wine 
stores to carry hard liquor, thus turning cold beer and wine stores into private liquor 
stores. Rick Thorpe further states that "The government brings no special talents or 
purpose to retailing, warehousing or distributing alcohol. Increasing opportunities for 
private-sector involvement will result in improved services, consumer choice and access, 
and better use ofLDB resources."6 
In late 2003 rumors that the Liberals would not be closing all government run retail 
locations started to surface. Rich Coleman, then British Columbia's Solicitor General 
5 British Columbia Ministry of Competition and Science. "Liquor Branch Reforms Will Improve Service", 
24 July 2002, http: //www2.news.gov.bc.ca/archive/200 l-2005/2002CSE0054-000575 .htm 
(1 0 January 2007). 
6 British Columbia Ministry of Competition and Science, 2002. pg. 30. 
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announced that the province was reviewing the decision to privatize liquor retailing. 
During the period of 2003-2004 the number of private liquor store licenses increased to 
544 from 290 even though a feeling of uncertainty prevailed as to what the government' s 
final decision would be. 
Confusion Continues 2005-2006 
As of December 31 2006, the government had closed 24 of the 224 government 
controlled stores across the province. The government, by allowing an increase in the 
amount of private liquor stores operating in the province has directly allowed more 
competition for its own stores. Private retailers in tum have to compete with government 
stores. The government is currently expanding and renovating government liquor store 
locations in some areas of the province and closing and downsizing stores in other areas. 
No government policy as to which direction the Liquor Distribution Branch is taking is 
available to the public at this time. At present, in British Columbia, there are 609 private 
retail liquor stores and 200 government liquor stores. When the numbers are combined 
there is 1 liquor store for every 4,800 people in British Columbia. 
A crucial point remains - is alcohol just another consumer product? If the answer is yes, 
then the government has no business running retail locations and the basis of this paper is 
irrelevant and privatization should flourish as in any other retail industry. However, the 
health and social implications blur the picture and we are left at a cross-road between free 
market commerce and society' s well being. The result is that British Columbia remains in 
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a transition period between the public and private sector with both sectors fighting for the 
same consumer dollar. 
In order to examine the social and economic implications of privatization we must first 
understand the workings of the public and private sector. The BCLDB orders all products 
for both its government run stores as well as privately run liquor stores from the same 
manufacture or national distributor, except in some instances where private retailers may 
purchase certain specialty wine products directly from a winery. All products are held in 
a government controlled warehouse in either Kamloops or Vancouver. All privately run 
stores must buy their product from the government warehouses and no volume or 
quantity discounts are given. As an example, a bottle of Wolf Blass Yellow Label 
Cabernet Sauvignon is used to show price purchasing differences between the public and 
private sector in Figure 1.0 below. 
(F tgure 10 c - ompanng p d c ro uct ost- BC L. tquor D .. b . B tstn utwn ranc h versus p· nvate 
Price Breakdown Government Private 
Store Store 
Purchase Cost $6.59 n/a 
Provincial mark up $9.88 n/a 
Federal markup $1.48 n/a 
Retail Price $17.95 $17.95 
Retail discount to Private Store n/a 13% 
Cost Discount to private store n/a $2.33 
Total Cost to Private Store n/a $15.62 
*Note that the Yellow Label Government cost was obtamed from the Parkland Institute. 
Available http://www. ualberta. ca/P ARKLAND/research/stud ies/sobering-resul t-final. pdf: 
The private store discount is from personal store data. 
t Sore) 
As seen in Figure I . 0 the price structure between government and private stores IS 
dramatically different. To compare private stores to the government stores would be 
completely one-sided in regards to product cost and profit. A benefit to government is 
that the government does not have to pay for goods it purchases from its suppliers until 
the product actually sells off the shelf. This in turn means no up front cash is required for 
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purchases and carrying costs are thus eliminated. In the private sector all purchases must 
be prepaid before delivery. If a product is running low or soon to be out of stock at the 
government warehouses the government stores receive the product first before the private 
sector. Private liquor stores are not allowed to sell products below the retail price in 
government liquor stores, thus creating no competition. Most private stores find it 
impossible to operate on a 13% gross margin thus having to increase the price above 
what the government' s selling price for the same product is. 
While it is worth noting the obvious cost advantage the government retail stores have 
against the private stores in British Columbia, most policy papers and research reports 
provide little or no knowledge of the inner workings of rules and regulations that differ 
between the private and public sector. The common element from most research suggests 
that private stores are over-priced, provide limited selection and neglect society' s well-
being. On the pro-privatization side research suggests that free-market competition is the 
answer and that the government has no business being in the retail liquor industry. 
Another broad argument in favour of privatization is that "government enterprises are 
poorly managed, cannot compete in the marketplace, shy away from risk-taking, and 
cannot survive without continued government handouts of taxpayers' money."7 Much of 
research available to date focuses on Alberta's privatization of its liquor industry with 
some emphasis on Quebec' s wine privatization in grocery stores. 
7 Jazairi Nuri, "Privatizing the Liquor Control Board ofOnatrio", Department of Economics, York 
University, Pg. 29, September 1994, www.yorku.ca/nurillcbo.htm. (12 June 2007). 
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Chapter Two - The Alberta Privatization Experience 
In 1993 Alberta abruptly announced its plans for privatizing liquor retailing in Alberta. 
Within six months 205 government controlled liquor stores were closed. The Consumer 
Association of Canada' s Report on Liquor Store Privatization stated "Alberta' s policy 
was to avoid restrictions on the number of private stores allowed to open in a community, 
retail prices, building design or minimum selling area. Alberta has met the traditional 
open market forces of scale, volume discounts and location."8 However, in some 
instances it may be hard for small private retailers to compete with large chain stores in 
regards to volume discounts, buying power and advertising. As is evident in most 
evolving industries, small one store operators are been forced to sell to existing large 
chain stores such as Liquor Barn, Liquor Depot and Great Canadian Liquor. 
Alberta's quick transition from public to private saw a huge influx of store openings and 
rapid government closures. Today, 907 fully private stores are in existence in Alberta 
which equates to one liquor store for 3,400 people.9 According to the Alberta Liquor 
Control Board,"the (ALCB) released 90% of total ALCB staff, amounting to 1,866 
employees, costing the Alberta government $17 million in severance benefits." 10 The 
Alberta Government Employees Union filed successor rights in regards to any private 
operator opening a new private liquor store. That operator would be required to recognize 
the union at that location. Neither the Alberta Labour Relations Board nor the Crown was 
found to warrant a common employer designation, thus eliminating any union succession 
8 
"Privatization of B.C.'s Retail Liquor Store System. Implications for Consumers", Consumers 
Association Canada, Pg. 9, May 2003, http://www.consumer.ca/1542. (16 November 2006). 
9 Milke, "Ending the Prohibition on Competition", 2002, Pg. 26 
10 Douglas West, "The Privatization of Liquor Retailing in Alberta" January 2003, Pg. 28. 
http: //www.fraserinstitute.org/COMMERCE. WEB/product_files/West2002 .pdf ( 15 December 2006). 
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rights. 11 The lost union jobs have been largely replaced by the influx of job openings in 
the private liquor store sector. Obviously private sector jobs due not pay the wages and 
benefits as the public sector; however, "it is estimated that 3,500 full and part-time jobs 
have been created since privatization." 12 It should be noted that Alberta' s limited 
restrictions on advertising and promotion have spin-off effects to other industries outside 
liquor retailing. 
One would suspect that due to the large increase in liquor stores from 205 to 907 stores 
across the province that a failure rate or closure of non-profitable stores would result. 
However, when comparing the numbers "only six stores in Calgary, six stores in 
Edmonton and sixteen stores in the rest of Alberta have closed." 13 With the closure of the 
ALCB' s government stores, the market had to dictate the amount of liquor stores that 
Alberta needed in order to service the province. As is the case in most industries in the 
developing stages, there is an influx of competition to a point of saturation at which point 
competitors no longer enter the market or in some instances divest themselves and exit 
the market. In a report written by Douglas West of the University of Alberta it is 
mentioned that the "lack of conversion of ALCB stores in smaller communities is a result 
of the old ALCB store leasing a high profile location for which many small retailers 
could not afford if competition entered the community." 14 The Alberta Gaming and 
Liquor Commission (AGLC) website shows privatization statistics showing increases in 
sales, employment and product selection through privatization as seen below in 
11 West, "The Privatization of Liquor Retailing in Alberta", 2002, Pg. 6. 
12 Milke, "Ending the Prohibition on Competition", 2002. Pg. 29. 
13 West, "The Privatization of Liquor Retailing in Alberta", 2002, Pg. 38. 
14 West, "The Privatization of Liquor Retailing in Alberta", 2002, Pg. 37. 
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Figure 1.1. It must be noted that various studies and independent reviews analyzed for 
this project dispute or question the Alberta Government's facts and figures represented 
below in Figure 1.1 such as the Parkland Institutes 2003 study "Sobering Result." 
Figure 1.1- Alberta Gaming & Liquor Commission -Pre and Post Privatization Comparison 
Source: Gaming and Liquor Commission 
http://www.aglc.gov.ab.ca/liquor/albertaliquorprivatization.asp 
Before Alberta Privatization (prior to Sept. 2, 1993) 
Number of retail outlets- 304 
• 202 Alberta Liquor Control Board retail stores 
• 30 retail beer stores 
• 23 wine stores 
• 49 agency stores 
Number of products- 3,325 
Employment - I,300 full and part-time jobs 
Liquor prices - ''postage stamp" prices across the province in government-run stores 
Liquor sales: 
By Volume 
-- - -·· -
Spirits I72, 000 hectolitres 
Wine I62,300 hectolitres 
Sales 
$413,761,000 
$135,I02,000 
Coolers/cider 34,600 hectolitres 
.... -- .- -- -~ ------ ----· .•. ··-··i 
. .$I5,040, 000 i 
Beer .I,824,000 hectolitres 
After Privatization (as of April2007) 
Number of retail outlets - I, I44 
• I, 056 private retail liquor stores 
• 88 general merchandise liquor stores (rural locations) 
Number of products available- 13,455 
Employment- 4, 000 full and part-time jobs 
Liquor sales: 
1By Volume 
Spirits 223,546 hectolitres 
Wine 260,400 hectolitres 
---- ----- -----
.Coolers/cider I33, 886 hectolitres 
Beer 2,447,587 hectolitres 
$48I, 745,000_ - --- J 
)005106 Actual I 
I 
$524,937,000 l I 
$297,263,000 
-----1 ---- ----$58,655,000 
$774,739,000 
Product Selection 
Product selection IS a highly debatable topic between advocates for and against 
privatization. It is the common belief that under privatization small private stores cannot 
afford to carry large inventories. However, the opposite effect occurred in Alberta as seen 
in a study conducted by Westridge Marketing Services. The survey discussed by Douglas 
West in "The Privatization of Liquor Retailing in Alberta" uses 100 private liquor stores 
in Alberta as its sample size. This survey counted the number of SKU's (Stock Keeping 
Units) or the number of products available. The provincial average before privatization 
was 950 SKU' s per government store.15 The Westridge survey concluded that after 
privatization the provincial average increased to 1 ,052. The ALCB specialty stores in 
both Edmonton and Calgary carried upwards of 2,600 SKU' s before privatization. 
Westridge Marketing found large private stores in urban centers to carry over 3,900 
SKU' s far exceeding the 2,600 SKU's of the government stores.16 The Canadian 
Taxpayer Federation reported that "18,876 liquor products" 17 are available in Alberta 
meaning that over 18,876 products, if required, are available to private operators within 
Alberta. "British Columbia currently has only 11,977 products listed." 18 Although there 
are staggering differences in SKU's between stores and provinces one must note that 
private liquor stores in smaller communities usually carry less product selection due to 
limited demand and high carrying costs for slow moving items. In British Columbia, for 
example, the average government run liquor store is approximately 6,000 square feet. 19 
Which when "in comparison, private stores in British Columbia on average range in size 
15 West, "The Privatization ofLiquor Retailing in Alberta", 2002, Pg. 10. 
16 West, "The Privatization of Liquor Retailing in Alberta",2002, Pg. 24. 
17 Milke, "Ending the Prohibition on Competition", Pg. 28, 2002 . 
18 Milke, "Ending the Prohibition on Competition", Pg. 28. 2002. 
19 Consumer Association of Canada, May 2003 , Pg. 22. 
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from 500- 2500 square feet, thus reducing product selection."20 Store size does mean less 
available room for products however, the volume of product sold in some smaller "cold 
beer and wine" stores in British Columbia is comparable in some cases to government 
controlled liquor stores with larger selection and square footage. 
Product Price 
The difference between Alberta and British Columbia is that true competition and free 
market pricing exist in Alberta. Greg Flanagan of the Parkland Institute concludes that 
"over the recent period of privatization, liquor prices have been more volatile in Alberta 
than in the rest of Canada."2 1 Varying arguments regarding liquor pricing have been 
made. Firstly, pricing alcohol at a higher price reduces consumption, thus contributing to 
less harm to public welfare. As a result higher prices compensate for the social costs 
incurred. However, privatization reports such as the Parkland Institutes "Sobering Result" 
argue that in a true economic sense "in general the lower the price for any consumer 
product, the better off individuals and families will be all other things constant."22 The 
Parkland Institute references a study by Johnson et al (1992) which looks at the effects of 
a 1% increase in price with respect to consumption. The study concluded that "beer 
consumption will reduce by .3%, wine by .9% and spirits by .5%."23 It can be concluded 
that the price study conducted by Johnson et al could be a contributing factor as to why 
private British Columbia private liquor stores are not as financially successful as British 
2° Consumer Association of Canada, May 2003 , Pg. 22. 
21 
Greg Flanagan, "Sobering Result. The Alberta Liquor Industry Ten Years After Privatization", Parkland 
Institute, Pg. 28, June 2003 , http://www.ualberta.ca/- parkland/research/studies/sobering-result-final.pdf 
(September 18, 2006). 
22 Flanagan, "Sobering Result", 2003 . Pg. 28 . 
23 Flanagan, "Sobering Result", 2003 . Pg. 28 
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Columbia government liquor stores. Most private stores m British Columbia charge 
higher prices than government stores which is ultimately a factor for reducing 
consumption as well as lost sales to the private operator. Consumption and purchasing 
may be less at private stores due to higher mark-ups and may ultimately increase at 
government liquor stores if the study holds true. 
Most studies across Canada that compare price show that some prices on products are 
higher in one area and lower in another. Greg Flanagan of the Parkland Institute attributes 
the "discrepancies in prices between jurisdictions as a result of different tax methods and 
the prevalence of variable pricing in Alberta."24 British Columbia and Alberta use 
different methods of calculating liquor tax. For example, Alberta uses a flat tax system 
whereas British Columbia uses an ad valorum (a percentage of cost).25 This results in 
British Columbia's higher price products usually costing more than in Alberta. It must be 
noted that Alberta uses daily loss leaders to entice customers thus skewing survey results 
in price surveys. However, given the various differences in tax calculations and skewed 
results due to loss leaders in Alberta "it is possible for a consumer to find a lower product 
price in Alberta than in British Columbia provided the consumer shops around."26 The 
Alberta Liquor Control Board will not release true costs of products due to private 
enterprise restrictions. An article in the Vancouver Sun dated October 28, 2006 reported 
that "15% of private stores in British Columbia reported that they compete with the 
government on price."27 For a private store to compete with provincial government stores 
24 Flanagan, "Sobering Result", 2003, Pg. 33. 
25 Flanagan, "Sobering Result", 2003. Pg. 33. 
26 West, "The Privatization ofLiquor Retailing in Alberta", 2003. Pg. 56. 
27 
Michael Kane, "The Cost of Convenience", Pg. D I, Vancouver Sun. 28 October 2006. 
13 
on price is very risky due to the inadequate wholesale prices private stores receive from 
the government. A private store in some instances can compete provided they have large 
product selection, uniform pricing and ample square footage. The Vancouver Sun report 
further mentioned that comparing a private store to a government store was like 
comparing a 7-Eleven to a Safeway.28 The Vancouver Sun article further quotes David 
Crown, of the British Columbia Alliance of Beverage Licensees, stating that "private 
stores receive a 13% discount from the government on product whereas it costs upwards 
of 29% to run a private store."29 The Consumer Association of Canada found that if 
Alberta's experience in privatization is used to measure the level of gross profit that 
British Columbia private liquor stores are receiving is now far from adequate to sustain 
this type of business. 30 
Another argument is the fear that under privatization price discrimination would increase 
significantly for consumers living in rural areas. The argument of rural-urban price 
discrimination is a reality with most types of retail goods that involve transportation and 
shipping costs to remote locations outside urban areas. Why should alcohol, like any 
other consumer product, not be subject to transportation and shipping costs? Currently all 
provinces under government monopolies have uniform pricing regardless of a rural or 
urban centre. Furthermore, government liquor monopolies argue that under privatization 
product selection would grossly diminish in rural areas. Obviously, the private sector can 
not afford to carry products that do not sell or have too high a carrying cost. As Nuri 
Jazairi of the Department of Economics at York University points out "small privately-
28 Kane, "The Cost of Convenience", 2006, Pg. D4. 
29 Kane, "The Cost of Convenience", 2006, Pg. D4. 
30 "Privatization of B.C.'s Retail Liquor Store System", 2003 , Pg. 17. 
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owned retailers will replace less profitable items and reorganize their shelves to fill with 
popular best sellers of spirits and wines."31 Under privatization prices in rural 
communities may rise slightly due to market forces and selection would ultimately 
decrease in some circumstances. Alcohol is not a public service but a consumer good that 
should be subjected to market forces like all other consumer goods regardless of location. 
Mark Milke of the Canadian Taxpayer Federation furthers the argument that alcohol is 
just another consumer product with the statement that "If the government (properly) 
declines to set uniform province-wide prices for house prices or for necessities of life 
such as food, it is hardly a core function of government to set uniform prices for non-
necessary purchases such as alcoholic beverages."32 By allowing the government full 
control of product price and product listings within British Columbia we as British 
Columbians are ultimately been held captive by a monopoly. As consumers, the freedom 
of selection, price and savings are marginalized as compared to our neighbours in 
Alberta. 
Social Implications 
Liquor consumption and liquor retailing in British Columbia are legal if you abide by the 
regulatory rules and regulations. Many studies, depending on the institution 
commissioning the study, focus on the social ills of liquor retailing and fail to recognize 
the large part of society who enjoy and consumes alcoholic beverages in a safe, 
responsible manner. However, many social and health problems are directly related to 
the abuse of alcohol. In society, there is a portion of individuals who abuse products. 
3 1 Jazairi , "Privatizing The Liquor Control Board of Ontario", 1994, Pg.55. 
32 Milke, "Ending the Prohibition on Competition", 2002, Pg. 3. 
15 
These individuals are legally allowed to abuse products as long as this abuse does not 
harm society. If this abuse, such as increased health care costs from drinking related 
illnesses and impaired driving accidents affect society then some form of regulation is 
required. The percentage of society that abuses and creates negative publicity for the 
liquor industry "lends support to those who call for public regulation in the marketing of 
alcoholic beverages."33 The question remains does the government's involvement in the 
distribution of alcohol minimize the negative social consequences alcohol creates? No 
research or study available has been able to answer the question posed. Several research 
studies have looked at correlations between crime, impaired driving and domestic 
violence but little or no correlation has been found due to multiple variables such as 
demographics, cultural and societal changes. What does remain in both Alberta and 
British Columbia - public or private - is that both governments are the largest distributor 
of alcohol in their province. The Alberta government still controls distribution to all 
private liquor stores and British Columbia's government distributes to its own 200 retail 
stores and over 600 private liquor stores throughout the province. 
In the past most government controlled monopolies considered social implications the 
reason for regulatory control. In theory, the social wellbeing of society is noted as one of 
the most important aspects of regulated alcohol control. We must never forget that the 
side agenda for government alcohol monopolies is tax revenue. 
If an activity is considered socially unacceptable such as gambling, drinking, smoking -
do these activities warrant a need for regulation? There are no justifiable grounds that the 
33 Flannagan, "Sobering Result", 2003 , Pg. I 0. 
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government can provide socially unacceptable services better than the private sector. For 
example, since the government sells liquor direct to consumers, does this decrease the 
chance of impaired driving or a violent incident? 
When looking in to alcohol ' s social ills we must also look at that portion of society who 
enjoys consuming alcohol in a safe responsible manner, the individuals who work in the 
industry and the companies and governments who have made significant investments in 
the liquor and hospitality industries. If alcohol were abolished or if taxes were utilized to 
curb consumption as in the case of cigarettes, the liquor and hospitality industries would 
not only face a drastic financial crisis, but drastic levels of unemployment within the 
whole industry sector would occur. When considering the social ills, do we, as a society, 
look at a winery or going to a wine-tasting seminar as a social ill? Obviously not. Since 
wineries are allowed to sell wine which "creates social ills" should the provincial 
government purchase all wineries in British Columbia and make and sell wine in order to 
reduce the social ills to society? 
Many proponents of health advocacy push the argument that an increase in tax will 
decreases consumption. Increased pncmg and taxation IS a method for controlling 
consumption. This principle must be carefully implemented; as noted by the Toronto 
Centre for Research and Addictions that pushing prices and taxes too high will usually 
encourage unintended consequences, not only for the economy and tax revenue but also 
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for health and safety. 34 If the government increases taxes to a level that becomes 
unaffordable there is a health risk that those individuals may start consuming black 
market alcohol. Dr. Tim Stockwell, of Addictions Research British Columbia gives 
several examples of studies conducted on the repercussions of black market alcohol; one 
study by (Nuzhnyl 2004) reviewed by Stockwell found that "deaths from the 
consumption of illegal and contaminated alcohol have been reported in many countries, 
often associated among economically disadvantage people seeking more affordable 
alcohol."35 It is well known in British Columbia that low cost high alcohol content beers 
are an increasing segment for government and private liquor stores. With alcohol taxes 
rising annually every January in British Columbia, consumers may be forced into finding 
alternative methods of purchasing alcoholic beverages or ultimately reducing 
consumption. 
There is vast evidence to suggest that consumption is influenced by the price of alcohol. 
Stockwell identifies a study conducted by Edwards et al (1994) which identified 53 
studies spanning 17 countries and 120 years of price and consumption data. This study by 
Edwards concluded that "among these studies only three failed to find the expected 
negative relationship between alcohol prices and levels of consumption for all three of 
the major beverage categories of beer, wine and spirits, and only one study failed to find 
this relationship for more than one of these categories."36 Basic economic principles 
apply in that if you decrease the price of a product consumption will increase. This is 
34 
Tim Stockwell, Jiali Leng, Jodi Sturge, "Alcohol Pricing and Public Health in Canada: Issues and 
Opportunities", Centre for Addictions Research ofB.C.,February 2006. Pg. 4. 
http://carbc.ca/portals/O/resources/ AlcPricingFeb06.pdf (20 January 2007). 
35 Stockwell eta!., "Alcohol Pricing", 2006, Pg. 4 
36 Stockwell eta!. , "Alcohol Pricing", 2006, Pg. 5. 
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especially evident in British Columbia' s bars and nightclubs which promote student 
nights. These venues target college and university students by offering no "cover charge" 
on student nights as well as drink specials as low as $1 .50 per drink. This type of pricing 
in British Columbia promotes heavy binge drinking which can ultimately lead to 
excessive drinking on a regular basis. To curb consumption as pointed out by Stockwell, 
in a study by Williams et al. in (2002) "lower price increases consumption among young 
drinkers but research has found that, when faced with a higher cost of alcohol, students 
are less likely to make the transition from abstainer to moderate drinker to heavy 
drinker. "3 7 
It is evident that taxation to some extent is an available tool to moderate consumption. 
There is a fine line between moderating consumption and eventually pushing the 
consumer to a black market in order to find a less expensive product than is available in 
legally licensed liquor stores. Stockwell et al. (2006) suggests three possible scenarios to 
reduce the social implications of alcohol by means of taxation and pricing. The three 
scenarios are as follows: 
Scenario I: Index tax rates to inflation to prevent increased alcohol consumption 
and related harm caused by declines in real alcohol prices over time. 38 
Scenario 2: Close tax loopholes that permit the sale of extremely cheap alcohol to 
vulnerable groups. 39 
Scenario 3: Provide incentives for the manufacture, marketing and consumption 
of lower strength alcoholic beverages. 40 
37 Stockwell et al., "Alcohol Pricing", 2006 Pg. 6. 
38 Stockwell et al. , "Alcohol Pricing", 2006 Pg. 15. 
39 Stockwell et al. , "Alcohol Pricing", 2006 Pg. 16. 
40 Stockwell et al. , "Alcohol Pricing", 2006 Pg. 17. 
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Scenarios 1 and 2 do not provide options that would be accepted by the public; nor would 
the political ramifications for increasing alcohol tax be justified. As Stockwell states, 
"this would require at least a 30% increase in federal excise taxes on beer and spirits to 
match the rise in CPI since 1991."41 Increasing beer, liquor and wine prices by 30% would 
inevitably cripple the liquor industry in Canada. This scenario would also not reduce the 
portion of society who abuse alcohol but rather limit the portion of the population who 
enjoy alcoholic beverages responsibly. Scenario 2 also poses political repercussions in 
that the tax loophole that is discussed in the policy paper directly relates to the Native 
Indian 's ability to buy alcohol GST free on Indian reservations. The scenario suggests 
that consumption may possibly decrease by mandating that Native Indians pay GST on 
alcohol purchased on reserves meanwhile increasing alcohol rehabilitation and treatment 
centers within native communities.42 To mandate tax legislation on Native Indian bands 
would be a political uphill battle that would do little more than draw media attention for 
no gain. Stockwell ' s third and most viable scenario of the three relates to the promotion 
of lower strength alcoholic beverages. This option would reduce taxes on lower strength 
alcoholic beverages. In a study conducted by Stockwell et al (1998), found that 
"beverage types most associated with serious harm (alcohol-related hospital episodes and 
nighttime violence) were cheap bulk wines and "full strength" beers .... "43 However, as 
pointed out by Valentin Petkantchin of the Montreal Economic Institute, "risks connected 
with excessive drinking do not vanish because a store where beverages are purchased 
41 Stockwell et al., "Alchohol Pricing" 2006. Pg. 16. 
42 Stockwell et al. , "Alchohol Pricing" 2006, Pg. 17. 
43 Stockwell et al. , "Alchohol Pricing" 2006, Pg. 18. 
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belongs to the government rather than to a private business."44 The rationale for 
government liquor stores versus private stores when debating heavy liquor consumption 
is that the government is better suited to administer the sale of liquor because government 
is are looking out for society's wellbeing whereas private operators are operating strictly 
for profit. This argument holds little validity if a citizen consumes large amounts of 
alcohol in their home then decides to drive. Where the individual purchased their alcohol 
is irrelevant. 
It is not surprising that health care costs are actively debated when the issue of liquor 
privatization occurs - "it is a known fact that alcohol contributes to a wide range of health 
and social problems such as drinking and driving accidents, liver cirrhosis, cancers and 
addiction."45 The health risks of alcohol do not make it unique in that it requires a 
government run monopoly to import, market and distribute. Products such as cigarettes, 
knives, paint thinner, and chainsaws can all be considered dangerous products if used 
incorrectly but are not regulated by government monopolies. To further this point, the 
Montreal Economic Institute Study "Is Government Control of the Liquor Trade Still 
Justified?" quotes economist Douglas Whitman as saying, "Medical expenses created by 
drinking and other personal choices are not unavoidably external costs-they only exist 
because of government policies that spread such costs out over the public."46 Currently 
today, by default, government controlled liquor monopolies are the largest contributor to 
44 
Valentin Petkantchin, "Is government control of the liquor trade still justified?", Montreal Economic 
Institute: Regulation Series, October 2005 . Pg. 14. 
http:/ /www.iedm.org/main/show _publications_ en.php?publications _ id= 110. (November 10, 2006) 
45 Retail Alcohol Monopolies and Regulation: Preserving the Public Interest. Centre for Addiction and 
Mental Health. January 2004. Pg. 2, 
http://www.camh.net/Public_policy/Public_policy_papers/Retaii%20Aicohoi%20Monopolies%20Position 
%20Paper.pdf (January 24, 2007) 
46 Petkantchin, "Is government control of the liquor trade still justified?", 2005, Pg. 13. 
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liquor related health issues in their respective provinces. This been said, if privatization 
could supply the same amount or greater tax revenue than the current government 
monopoly, what difference does it make to the provincial healthcare system? 
All policy reports and findings address the economic issues before social implications of 
privatization. Provincial and federal taxes and markups are staggering. Gross liquor sales 
in British Columbia totaled $2.25 billion up $101 million for years 2005-2006 and net 
income of $800 million was realized according to the BCLDB 2006 Annual Report 
2006.47 The provincial governments cannot afford to lose an $800 million dollar a year 
cash cow even if the social implications outweigh tax revenue. 
Crime 
Crime and illegal acts are a large area of concern when considering increasing the 
number of liquor stores in a community. In 1993 when Alberta liquor privatization was 
launched and for the proceeding years after privatization the number of liquor stores 
drastically increased. One study by the Canadian Taxpayer Federation received data from 
the Calgary Police Service that reported criminal code offenses at liquor stores increased 
from 90 in 1992 to 357 in 2000.48 Obviously, one would expect increased crime against a 
particular store if a regulated industry was deregulated and allowed to expand. If a city 
had a regulated monopoly on movie stores or coffee shops and overnight deregulation of 
that industry occurred there would be a considerable amount of movie stores and coffee 
shops in the community. With an increase in coffee shops and movie stores the amount of 
47 British Columbia Liquor Distribution Branch 2006 Annual Report. 
http:/ /www.bcliquorstores.com/pd£'ldb _ ar05 _ 06.pdf (21 August 2006). 
48 Milke, Ending the Prohibition on Competition", 2002, Pg. 33 . 
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break-ins would obviously increase due to the sheer number of stores criminals would be 
able to target. 
A 2003 Fraser Institute study by Douglas West looked at infractions such as "minor in a 
licensed premise" and "minor obtaining liquor." These infractions did increase 
substantially after privatization in Alberta.49 However, we can not determine if the 
Alberta provincial government increased their level of enforcement against new "private 
liquor" stores in order set a precedent. A review of British Columbia's liquor infractions 
including "sale to a minor" has increased substantially since the 2002 push towards 
privatization. British Columbia has had a large influx of over 300 additional private 
liquor stores in the time period 2002-2006. One may note that liquor infractions of public 
record are only recorded for privately run liquor stores. If a private liquor store "sells to a 
minor" or to "an intoxicated person" that store is fined and possibly closed for a specified 
number of days. However, liquor infractions that occur in government controlled liquor 
stores are not reported and are not public record. Obviously, an increase in liquor 
infractions will be realized due to the large number of private stores within the last four 
years. All research studies available attribute some level of increased crime rates with an 
mcrease in the number of liquor stores, but no substantiated correlations have been 
proved. 
In Douglas West' s 2003 study "The Privatization of Liquor Retailing in Alberta" he 
points out: 
There are those who would still criticize the "population at risk" 
interpretation of liquor store robberies. They would simply argue that 
under government ownership there were fewer liquor stores and fewer 
49 West, "The Privatization of Liquor Retailing in Alberta", 2003, Pg. 62. 
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liquor store robberies. However, this view ignores the fact that besides 
liquor stores, there are many targets for commercial robberies. Hence, if 
there are fewer liquor stores to rob perhaps convenience stores and gas 
stations would be the targets of choice. Few people would suggest that 
the numbers of convenience stores or gas stations be reduced in order to 
reduce the chances of a convenience store or gas station being robbed. 
And surely fewer people would suggest that the government should own 
and operate convenience stores and gas stations in order to reduce the 
number of convenience store and gas station holdups. 50 
Smuggling and the illegal manufacturing of alcohol also pose major challenges for law 
enforcement, health and safety, and loss of tax revenue. As prohibition has taught us 
"consumers have demands that will be met. If the price is too high or is inflated 
artificially through taxes and duties, alternative sources will emerge."51 The black market 
poses risks for potential consumers. There are considerable health risks associated with 
black market liquor and the content in which the liquor was manufactured. The 
Mackenzie Institute study "Probation's Hangover" refers to a 1994 study completed by 
the Ontario Liquor Control Board (OLCB) on illegal black market alcohol in which "the 
Control Board estimates its loss of over $806 million dollars or about 15% of the total 
alcohol market in Ontario. "52 The black market flourished during prohibition and if taxes 
on liquor and cigarettes keep rising the government will in tum create its own 
competition with liquor being illegally imported from outside the province and the United 
States. 
The social implications of alcohol suggest that the price of alcohol be representative to 
compensate society for social costs created by the abuse of alcohol. To counter this 
50 West, "The Privatization of Liquor Retailing in Alberta", 2003 , Pg. 64. 
51 "Prohibition's Hangover -Ontario's Black Market in Alcohol." The Mackenzie Institute, October 1997, 
http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/1997/ I 997 _I 0 _Sex_ Alcohol.html. (January 20, 2007). 
52 "Prohibition's Hangover" (The size of the black market), 1997. 
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argument, liquor taxes or even the current tax structure in general is pushing demand 
away from legitimate retail toward the back market. Just recently the British Columbia 
Liquor Control Board found Boston Pizza in Cranbrook British Columbia guilty for 
selling liquor not purchased through the mandatory regulatory channels. 53 
Impaired Driving 
It is common knowledge that drinking-driving accidents are a major source of alcohol 
related fatalities. We, as society, are aware that there is an inordinate amount of alcohol 
related deaths on our highways each year. Drinking and driving is not seen as a social ill 
by some members of society. Yes, there are fines, license suspensions and the possibility 
of jail. However, we all know of individuals who have been charged or convicted of 
drinking and driving. Some members of society are of the conclusion that an individual 
who is charged with drinking and driving "made a mistake." Not until society considers 
drinking and driving more than a taboo, will we see drastic reductions in impaired driving 
offenses. Alberta still has a higher provincial average of 439 impaired driving convictions 
per 100,000 residents compared to the average of 295 in 1997-1998 for the rest of the 
country. 54 Comparing Statistics Canada data from 1981 to 1996 shows Alberta's impaired 
driving rate is slowly decreasing - however, Alberta is still above the national average. 55 
The 2003 Fraser Institute study further confirms that in Alberta 8,115 offences were 
recorded in 1991 before privatization and 4,643 were recorded in 1995 with 
53 Liquor Control & Licensing Branch. 26 November 2007. 
http://www.pssg.gov.bc.ca/Jclb/enforcements/htmi/2006/EH06-074.htm (30 November 2007) 
54 Flanagan, "Sobering Result", June 2003 , Pg. 16. 
55 "An Alberta Profile Of Criminal Justice Statistics", Alberta Summit on Justice, I 996, 
http://www.justice.gov.ab.ca/publications/justicesummit/stats/figll.htm (27 January 2007). 
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privatization.56 The Fraser Institute further states "There has clearly been no increase in 
liquor related traffic offenses that could be tied to the privatization of liquor stores."57 
Many factors are undeterminable when considering the reduction in impaired driving 
infractions. It is impossible to determine the increase or decrease in police road blocks or 
if drinking-driving advertising campaigns may be contributing to a reduction in impaired 
driving. 
Increased Outlet Density 
A 2007 report by the Alcohol System Review Panel in Ontario studied the effects of 
alcohol related issues and outlet density. The studies main conclusion was that "if there is 
more drinking in a population the risk of serious consequences are likely to increase and, 
collectively, these results indicate that anything that acts to increase per capita 
consumption can be expected to increase alcohol related harms."58 In a 2003 Harvard 
Medical Study "The Relationship of Alcohol Outlet Density to Heavy and Frequent 
Drinking and Drinking-Related Problems Among College Students at Eight Universities" 
concluded that in areas where alcohol density was highest students drank more and had 
more drinking-related problems.59 A further study in the Oxford Journal of Alcoholism, 
"Alcohol Outlet Density and Violence: A Geospatial Analysis", found similar findings as 
56 West. "Privatization of Liquor Retailing in Alberta" January 2003, Pg. 62. 
57 West, "Privatization of Liquor Retailing in Alberta" 2003, Pg. 62. 
58 
Robert E. Mann, Jurgen Rehm, Norman Giesbrecht, Robin Room, Edward Adlaf, Gerhard Gmel, Kate Graham, Esa 
Osterberg, Reginald Smart, and Michael Roerecke. "Alcohol Distribution, Alcohol Retailing and Social 
Responsibility", Centre of Social Research on Alcohol and Drugs, July 2005. Pg. 7. 
http:/ /www.fin.gov .on.ca/english/consultations/basr/basr _ alcoholdistr _ report. pdf. ( 18 November 2006). 
59 
Weitzman R. , Alison Folkman, Kerry Lemieux Folkman, and Henry Wechsler. "The Relationship of 
Alcohol Outlet Density to Heavy and Frequent Drinking and Drinking-Related Problems among College 
Students at Eight Universities", Harvard University. Department of Health & Social Behavior, Harvard 
School of Public Health. Pg. 4. July 2003.http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/cas/Documents/GIS/GISstudy2.pdf 
(18December 2006). 
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the Harvard study and concluded that there was a "clear association between alcohol 
outlet density and violence"60• The Oxford study also suggests that "the issues of alcohol 
availability and access are fundamental to the prevention of alcohol-related problems 
within communities."61 While statistics from the Fraser Institute study "The Privatization 
of Liquor Retailing in Alberta" are inconclusive for concluding that increased outlet 
density increases crime it would be safe to say that the accessibility of alcohol is much 
greater with privatization and that the social implications associated with alcohol abuse 
are much greater when under privatization due to the amount of alcohol available in the 
community. 
Government Revenues 
Many arguments exist to warrant the taxing of alcoholic beverages. Liquor is taxed both 
federally and provincially. The sale ofliquor as we all know can create ill social effects 
on society. One common element is that the taxes collected on the sale ofliquor can be 
used towards correcting social ills that are a result of alcohol. Alcohol and tobacco are 
not seen as necessity items which are not considered necessary by governments thus the 
high level of taxes. However, what we as society fail to mention is that these "not 
necessary" items are highly addictive and generate substantial revenue for governments. 
In typical government fashion with the reduction of GST from 6% to 5% in 2008 "taxes 
on alcohol have risen to offset the impact of the GST cut."62 With the government 
60 
D. M. Zhu, Gorman, and S. HoreL "Alcohol Outlet Density and Violence: A Geospatial Analysis", Alcohol 
& Alcoholism VoL 39, No. 4, pp. 369-375, 2004. alcalc.oxfordjoumals.org/cgi/content/abstract/39/4/369 
(3 January 2006). 
61 
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62 "Canada Day Tax Tweaks", CBC News Online, 4 July 2006, 
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27 
increasing prices on alcohol and tobacco to offset the "social ills" that generate the 
government billions of dollars per year, no research or study can actually put a dollar 
value to social costs as well as private costs derived from alcohol. Most studies indicate 
that the price of alcohol and tobacco are price inelastic to a certain level. Since alcohol 
consumption in society can be somewhat manipulated by taxation it is imperative for 
government policymakers to understand the repercussions of lowering or raising taxes on 
alcoholic beverages. In some cases "price elasticities vary according to time, place and 
beverage"63 . According to The Institute of Alcohol Studies "the normal finding is that the 
main traditional beverage in a society is less price elastic ie. less responsive to price 
changes than others."64 Meaning that if society's beverage of choice was beer or vodka 
then beer or vodka would not be as responsive to change as would wine. With British 
Columbia considering lowering the tax on "light beer" in order promote consumption of 
less alcoholic content beers, the effect maybe minimal because society's "main traditional 
beverage" is not light beer. 
The British Columbia Liquor Control Board reported an annual gross profit of $2.25 
billion in 2005-2006 or $800 million net income. British Columbia government liquor 
store sales have consistently been increasing year after year at a rate of 4% to 6%. 65 
Many critics of privatization argue that "potential revenue loss" will be a direct result of 
privatization. Alberta's experience with post-privatization revenues is somewhat murky. 
When privatization occurred in Alberta the government changed the way product taxes 
63 
"Alcohol: Tax, Price and Public Health", The Institute of Alcohol Studies. 28 February 2007 . Np. 
http://www.ias.org. uk/resources/factsheets/tax.pdf ( 15 October 2007). 
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"Alcohol: Tax, Price and Public Health", 2007. 
65 British Columbia Liquor Distribution Branch. 2005 - 2006 Annual Report. 
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were calculated. The markup structure moved from an "ad valorem" to a "flat markup". 
The Alberta government's main objective under privatization " .. . was to achieve the same 
level of profit on sales post-privatization as it was achieving pre-privatization."66 
However, one would think that with the Alberta government divesting itself of all union 
employees employed in retail stores around the province as well the cost of leasing high 
profile retail space that profit under privatization would ultimately increase. To 
complicate matters the Alberta Liquor Control and Gaming Board does not report net 
profits on liquor sales after 1996 because the use of consolidated statements for gaming 
and liquor are combined. Advocates for and against privatization in Alberta are at a loss 
to accurately report on the financial ramifications of the 1993 privatization initiative. 
However, the Alberta government estimates revenues from liquor sales of $493 million 
for 2001-2002, up from an estimated $468 million at year end of 2001. 67 Some research 
reports are not so optimistic. The 2003 Parkland Institute's policy paper "Sobering 
Result" takes into account " ... inflation, growth in population, and growth in sales at a 
constant level resulting in a loss in revenue since the inception of privatization. Measured 
appropriately, the current (flat) tax system in Alberta has resulted in lost revenue to the 
province from alcohol beverages."68 However, many studies discredit the notion that 
Alberta may or may not have lost revenue - the real issue is that the Alberta government 
realized that operating retail liquor stores was not a core function or a valuable use of 
government resources. 
66 West, "Privatization of Private Liquor Retailing in Alberta", 2003 , Pg. 12. 
67 West. "Privatization of Liquor Retailing in Alberta", 2003 , Pg. 13 . 
68 Flanagan, "Sobering Result", June 2003 . Pg. 26. 
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CHAPTER THREE -Methodology 
Privatization of liquor retailing appears to create an outpouring of emotions from health 
advocates, unions, political figures, taxpayers and private store operators. Upon review of 
numerous liquor privatization studies care must be exercised in weighing the credence of 
the study. Liquor privatization is a timely topic in Canada especially in British Columbia 
and Alberta. Many health advocacy groups, consumer associations, taxpayer associations, 
universities and private enterprise have commissioned studies into the effects of 
privatization. Almost all Canadian studies commissioned are very one-sided and fail to 
accurately report or study both sides of the privatization initiative. Liquor privatization is 
no different than any other privatization initiative with pros and cons. For the purpose of 
this paper I will expose the pros and cons for liquor privatization and, in particular, 
British Columbia. This paper will provide a compilation of liquor privatization studies 
and accurately report on the findings for and against privatization of liquor retailing. The 
studies reviewed in this literature review do hold credence in their respective position. 
What becomes very clear after review of numerous studies is the difference between 
economic and social issues. Generally, in society, economic issues supersede social 
issues. Studies completed by individuals or institutions in favour of privatization lean 
more heavily on the economic rationale for privatization than they do social implications. 
The opposite holds true for studies not in favour of privatization - these place social 
issues ahead of economic issues. 
Studies conduct by Harvard University and the Oxford Journal of Medicine concluded 
that increased liquor retail density leads to increased alcohol-related violence and 
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increased consumption. An objective caution must be used when analyzing studies 
conducted outside of Canada. Consideration for issues such as demographics, 
international liquor laws, income levels and locations are all relevant issues that would 
have to be analyzed if we were to base our decision to privatize British Columbia liquor 
retailing on a foreign study. An analysis of comparing Canadian liquor privatization 
studies to foreign liquor privatization and alcohol density would be too vast for the scope 
of this paper. Both the Harvard and the Oxford study were chosen for reference in this 
paper due to their relevance that supports rational thinking - that if you vastly increase the 
availability of a product through locations, extended hours, and convenience it would 
only make sense that consumption of this particular product would increase. 
Liquor privatization studies have used public information and freedom of information 
requests to obtain government information. Financial statements for government revenues 
and Statistics Canada Reports in regards to crime and impaired driving statistics paint a 
picture of the ill-effects of privatization without input from the private sector. In fairness, 
as previously mentioned, the private sector may not wish to be involved in such studies 
and thus no studies are available with privatization input. On the public sector side of the 
industry union representatives, protests, petitions and lobbies, and political figureheads 
are at the forefront to stop and curb privatization. 
Limitations that will likely result from the analysis will be the social implications of 
liquor privatization. The economics of liquor privatization are tangible for the most part. 
Several studies reviewed for this research paper can put a dollar value on whether liquor 
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privatization in the past has had an influence on tax revenues, employment and product 
cost. However, the social implications of liquor privatization leave open-ended 
discussions and no set dollar values as to whether the social costs and the responsible 
distribution of alcohol can be administered more effectively in the public or private 
sector. Further limitations include the final recommendations which will be based on 
prevwus studies that highlight valid points for both private and public distribution of 
alcohol. 
CHAPTER FOUR -Pre & Post Privatization Studies 
Hundreds of studies regarding privatization cost benefits and revenue maximization have 
been researched and studied. The full effects of pre - and post - privatization are 
somewhat difficult to measure. As noted by McFetridge in the "Economics of 
Privatization" study he concludes that "cross-sectional comparisons of private and 
government owned enterprise have had difficulty isolating the marginal effect of 
ownership on enterprise performance."69 However, in some cases, privatization initiatives 
result in regulatory constraints and true privatization does not exist. The pros and cons of 
privatization cannot in some instances be accurately measured due to limited change 
when converting from public to private enterprise. As pointed out by McFetridge, another 
issue to be raised is the level of control companies receive after privatization, "terms and 
conditions may be such as to preclude substantial change to the organization after 
privatization."70 John Hilke's book, "Cost Savings from Privatization- A Compilation of 
69 
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Study Findings" reviews over 100 studies of privatization. Hilke finds that "cost 
reductions of 20 percent to 50 percent result from privatization and, more importantly, 
increased competition."71 Hilke attributes the study findings to: 
1. Better management 
2. More productive equipment 
3. Greater incentives to innovate 
4. Incentive pay 
5. Efficient deployment of workers 
6. Greater use of part-time and temporary employees 
7. Comparative cost information 
8. work schedule for off peak hours 
The Hilke study fails to examine the effect that the cost reductions had on the end 
consumer and focuses specifically on the ability to reduce expenses for the organization. 
The study also failed to incorporate the level of government involvement that remained 
after privatization. Cost reductions may have been realized through privatization; 
however, the study does not determine if the level of service increased or decreased after 
privatization and if costs to end consumer increased or decreased. 
Most studies available comparing pre - and post - privatization have serious flaws due to 
the measuring techniques available when comparing price, crime, impaired driving and 
tax revenue. Flaws include tax calculation variations between British Columbia and 
Alberta, lost leaders and crime and impaired driving statistics that do not have credible 
correlations relating to increases in store density. Overall, most studies reviewed for this 
literature review push towards a cost benefit analysis of being in favour of privatization. 
Most studies fail to mention social implications and focus extensively on monetary and 
71
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efficiency gams for the operating company and the consumer. However, social 
implications are very relevant in the privatization of liquor retailing which greatly 
influences a negative light on liquor privatization. 
To fully understand the current disarray of British Columbia' s private versus public 
liquor retailing system we must first look at the rules and regulations under British 
Columbia' s Liquor Control and Licensing Act. The Liquor Control and Licensing Act 
has been in existence since 1921 after the end of prohibition. The rules and regulations 
that formulate the "Act" have their legitimate reasons in order to provide consumers and 
operators with guidelines and procedures in the best interest of safety and business. 
However, where the "Act" falls short is its abundance of amendments that change merely 
on provincial political interests. 
The Liquor Control and Licensing Act dictates all government regulated aspects of liquor 
retailing within the province of British Columbia. The largest issues of contention 
between private and government controlled liquor retail stores relate to location. One 
would think the "Act" would specify issues such as "distance from one store to another" 
or "size of stores." The "Act" specifically outlines legitimate issues as previously 
mentioned. Two factors that come into play have grossly caused serious areas of concern 
for private operators. Firstly, the government disregard for the Liquor Control and 
Licensing Act, and, secondly, the individual city by-laws that have directly limited liquor 
retailing in multiple municipalities across British Columbia. 
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CHAPTER FIVE -Examples of Inconsistent Licensing in British Columbia 
One of the biggest hurdles to overcome when weighing the pros and cons of liquor 
privatization comes to physical location. It is well documented that privatization leads to 
an increase in private liquor stores. The typical concern arises when the general 
population does not want a liquor store on every comer in the community. The 
government of British Columbia under the Liquor Control Act issued the following 
amendments to avoid the typical overabundance scenario: 
(a) the liquor-primary establishment is within 5 km of the licensee retail store 
and there will be a minimum distance criteria of 0. 5 kilometers between retail 
liquor stores. 
However, I will illustrate these location guidelines have held little credence with the 
moving and relocation of liquor stores. Also, various city councils have enacted by-laws 
that either condone or support privatization. 
Currently liquor control and licensing in British Columbia has become a political game 
for private and government run liquor stores. Using examples from Williams Lake, Port 
Coquitlam, Maple Ridge and Vernon I will show the gross misuse of rules and 
regulations under the Liquor Control and Licensing Act, which states that a privately run 
liquor store must be located within 5km from a pub or nightclub that holds a valid liquor 
license. Furthermore, the private liquor store must be a minimum distance of 0.5km from 
another retail liquor store. 
The following British Columbia municipalities are examples of municipalities that have 
not followed the Liquor Control and Licensing Act: 
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Williams Lake 
The Laughing Loon Pub and Liquor Store is located on Highway 97 as you enter 
Williams Lake from the south. The owners of the Laughing Loon Pub applied to the 
Liquor Control and Licensing Branch in Victoria for an application to move the private 
liquor store license to a large shopping centre in Kelowna. This relocation application 
was approved even though there is a 450km difference between the pub and private 
liquor store. This is against the 5km rule stated in the Liquor Control and Licensing Act. 
Port Coquitlam 
The Westwood Centre in Port Coquitlam is a large power shopping centre with anchors 
such as Costco, Home Depot, Staples and Canadian Tire. A neighbourhood pub by the 
name of Dewy's was constructed in the shopping centre and a private retail liquor store 
was built alongside the pub. A few years after Dewy's was constructed a large 
government liquor store was built 200 feet from the existing private liquor store which 
will ultimately financially cripple the private operator of Dewy's. In this instance 
government liquor stores do not have to abide by the 0.5km rule; however, private stores 
are required to. 
Another example that occurred in Port Coquitlam relates to a re-location application from 
an existing private liquor store that was located across from a park and playground setting 
within one block of an elementary school. The operator applied to re-locate the liquor 
store to a commercial shopping centre far from any residential homes - a good social and 
business decision on the owner' s part. The City of Port Coquitlam turned down the 
application. In a large commercial shopping centre businesses are considered prominent 
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and visual, but the City of Port Coquitlam decided that they did not want liquor stores 
displayed in highly visual areas. However, next to an elementary school and playground 
was considered acceptable. 
Vernon 
The City of V em on has the highest number of liquor stores per capita in the province of 
British Columbia according to Ray Novell of the BCGEU. 72 The city boasts an 
impressive number of 17 liquor stores for a population of 34,277 people according to 
Statistics Canada. The City of Vernon has five liquor stores that are all located less than 
0.5km apart. It is worth noting that two liquor stores in the community sit on opposite 
sides of the street from one another. 
Maple Ridge 
The City of Maple Ridge has enacted its own by-laws pertaining to the size of private 
liquor stores under its zoning criteria. The commercial zoning by-law that pertains to 
private liquor stores in Maple Ridge states that: 
Licensee retail store use shall: 
i) be located within a liquor primary establishment; and 
ii) not exceed 40% gross floor area 
The City of Maple Ridge, through the use of by-laws, has restricted the size of private 
liquor stores as well as the location by mandating that the liquor store must be physically 
attached to a pub or nightclub. The Liquor Control and Licensing Act stipulates that 
operators may locate a liquor store within 5km of the pub or nightclub. However, in this 
72 Vernon City Council Public Hearing. 14 October 2003. (In attendance) 
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case Maple Ridge's municipal zoning by-laws dictate liquor store location, not the Liquor 
Control and Licensing Act. 
As seen in the above examples, the Liquor Licensing Act contains broad guidelines but 
has been far from adequate in regulating the locations of private and government 
controlled liquor stores. Municipalities, planning departments and local by-laws have 
dictated the liquor industry in British Columbia. Some municipalities are open to 
privatization and have allowed an increase in private liquor stores whereas other 
municipalities have moratoriums in place. Table 1. 0 and 1.1 (pg.39 and 40) show a city 
by city total of private and government liquor stores currently operating in British 
Columbia. 
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Table 1. 0- Private Liquor Stores per city in British Columbia 
CITY No . CITY No. CITY No. 
VANCOUVER 60 QUALICUM BEACH 3 COWICHAN BAY 1 
SURREY 31 SAANICHTON 3 CROFTON 1 
KELOWNA 27 SALT SPRING ISLAND 3 CULTUS LAKE 1 
KAMLOOPS 26 S 0 0 KE 3 CUMBERLAND 1 
NANAIMO 25 SQUAMISH 3 DAGGER LAKE 1 
PRINCE GEORGE 25 TRAIL 3 DEWDNE Y 1 
VICTORIA 23 VALEMOUNT 3 EGMONT 1 
RICHMOND 22 VIEW ROYAL 3 ELKFORD 1 
CHILLIWACK 14 WESTBANK 3 FORT FRASER 1 
VERNON 14 WHISTLER 3 FORT NELSON 1 
CAMPBELL RIVER 13 AGASSIZ 2 FRASER LAKE 1 
NEW WESTMINSTER 13 ALERT BAY 2 FRUITV A LE 1 
NORTH VANCOUVER 13 ARMS TRONG 2 GALIANO ISLAND 1 
COQUIT LAM 1 2 BURNS LAKE 2 GARDEN B AY 1 
DELTA 1 2 CHAS E 2 GARIBALDI HIGHLANDS 1 
LANGLE Y 1 2 CHETWYND 2 GREENWOOD 1 
SAANICH 1 2 CLIN TON 2 H A RRISON MILLS 1 
QUESNEL 10 COBBLE HILL 2 HAZELTON 1 
MAPLE RIDGE 9 COLWOOD 2 HIXON 1 
PORT ALBERN I 9 ENDERBY 2 HORNBY IS L AND 1 
PORT COQUITLAM 9 FORT NELSON 2 H U D S 0 N "S H 0 P E 1 
BURNAB Y B FORT ST . JAMES 2 INVERMER E 1 
ABBOTSFORD 7 GIBSONS 2 JAFFRAY 1 
FORT ST . JOHN 7 G 0 L D RIVER 2 KAS L O 1 
PENTICTON 7 GRAND FOR KS 2 K EREMEOS 1 
POWELL RIVER 7 HARRISON HOT SPRINGS 2 L AKE COWICHAN 1 
DUNCAN 6 HOUSTON 2 LANTZVILLE 1 
PR INC E RUPERT 6 LADYSMITH 2 LOWER NICOLA 1 
CASTLEGAR 5 LAKE COUNTRY 2 MACKENZIE 1 
COURTENAY 5 LILLOOET 2 MADEIRA PAR K 1 
ESQU IMALT 5 LOGAN LAKE 2 MALAKWA 1 
LANGFORD 5 LUMBY 2 MASSET 1 
MISSION 5 NANOOSE BAY 2 MAYNE ISLAND 1 
PARKSVILLE 5 OAK BA Y 2 MILL BAY 1 
SALMON ARM 5 0 LIVER 2 NAKUSP 1 
TERRACE 5 OSOYOOS 2 NEW DENVER 1 
WILLIAMS L AK E 5 PE ACH L AND 2 NEW HAZELTON 1 
COMO X 4 PITT MEADOWS 2 NORT H COWIC H AN 1 
CRANBROOK 4 PORT MCNEILL 2 OKANAGAN FALLS 1 
FERN IE 4 PRINCETON 2 PEMBERTON 1 
KIMBERLEY 4 RADIUM HOT SPRINGS 2 PENDER ISLAND 1 
KITIMAT 4 ROSSLAND 2 PORT RENFREW 1 
MERRITT 4 S A LM 0 2 POUCE COUPE 1 
NELSON 4 SICAMOUS 2 QUEEN CHARLOTTE CITY 1 
PORT MOOD Y 4 STEWART 2 SAYWARD 1 
REVELSTO K E 4 SUMMERLAND 2 SETON PORTAGE 1 
SECHELT 4 WHITE ROCK 2 SHAWNIGAN LAKE 1 
SIDNE Y 4 100 MILE HOUSE 1 SOINTULA 1 
SMITHERS 4 B AR RIERE 1 SOUTH PENDER IS L AND 1 
VANDERHOOF 4 BOST ON BAR 1 SPARWOOD 1 
WEST VANCOUVER 4 BOWEN ISLAND 1 SUN PE AKS 1 
ALDER GROVE 3 BRENTWOOD BA Y 1 T A H SIS 1 
CHEMAINUS 3 CAC HE CREEK 1 T AYLOR 1 
CRESTON 3 CANAL FLATS 1 TELKWA 1 
DAWSON CREEK 3 C HRIST INA LAKE 1 THETIS ISLAND 1 
GABRIOLA IS LAND 3 CL EARW AT ER 1 TO FIN 0 1 
GOLDEN 3 CLOVERDALE 1 TUMBLER RIDGE 1 
HOPE 3 GO LDSTRE AM 1 UCLUELET 1 
PORT HARDY 3 COOMBS 1 WASA 1 
YOU BOU 1 
•Data c ollected from the L iquor Control and L ic ens ing Branch of B ritish C o lumb ia ZE B AL LO S 1 
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Table 1.1 - Government Liquor Stores per city in British Columbia 
City No. City No. City No. 
Vancouver 23 Tahsis lnvermere 
Victoria 13 Totino Kaslo 
Surrey Stores 9 Ucluelet Kimberley 
North Vancouver 7 Agassiz Nakusp 
Burnaby 6 Gibsons Nelson 
Richmond 6 Hope New Denver 
Langley 5 Lillooet Radium 
Kamloops 5 Madeira Park Rossland 
Kelowna 4 Mission Plaza Salmo 
Prince George 4 Pitt Meadows Sparwood 
Nanaimo 3 Port Moody Trail 
Delta 3 Sechelt Cariboo 
Port Coquitlam 3 Squamish 100 Mile House 
West Vancouver 3 White Rock MacKenzie 
Whistler 3 Armstrong McBride 
Campbell River 2 Ashcroft Hart Highway 
Parksville 2 Barriere 10th Avenue 
Abbotsford 2 Cache Creek College Heights 
Chilliwack 2 Chase Parkwood Place 
Coquitlam 2 Clearwater Quesnel 
Maple Ridge 2 Clinton Valemount 
New Westminster 2 Enderby Williams Lake 
Vernon 2 Golden North Coast 
Alert Bay 1 Keremeos Hazelton 
Bella Coola Logan Lake Kitimat 
Chemainus Lumby Massett 
Com ox Lytton Prince Rupert 
Courtenay Merritt Queen Charlotte 
Cumberland Oliver Stewart 
Duncan Osoyoos Terrace 
Gabriela Island Penticton Nechako 
Ganges Princeton Burns Lake 
Gold River Revelstoke Fort St. James 
Ladysmith Salmon Arm Fraser Lake 
Lake Cowichan Sicamous Houston 
Mill Bay Summerland Smithers 
Pender Island Winfield Vanderhoof 
Port Alberni Castlegar Peace River 
Port Alice Cranbrook Chetwynd 
Port Hardy Creston Valley Dawson Creek 
Port McNeill Elkford Fort Nelson 
Powell River Fernie Fort St. John 
Qualicum Fruitvale Hudson Hope 
Sidney Grand Forks Tumbler Ridge 
Sooke Greenwood 
Data comprised from the B.C. Liquor Control & Licens ing Branch 
40 
The previous tables (1. 0 and 1.1) indicate the number of private liquor stores currently 
operating in their respective municipalities. The number of private liquor stores per 
municipality also includes "re-location" applications that are currently being processed so 
in some circumstances the number of liquor stores per municipality in Table I. 0 could be 
overly misrepresented due to a "re-location" application of an already existing private 
liquor store. 
The provincial government, in conjunction with the Liquor Control and Licensing 
Branch, is in a consolidation phase of closing smaller provincial liquor stores and 
amalgamating these smaller stores into larger "big-box" liquor stores in high profile 
shopping centers throughout the province. The government is calling these new mega 
liquor stores "Signature Liquor stores." Currently there are twenty Signature Liquor 
stores operating in the following locations shown in Table 1.2 below. 
Table 1.2- Signature Government Liquor Stores in British Columbia 
B.C. Government Signature Liquor Stores 
Thurlow & Alberni (Downtown Vancouver) Langley 
39th & Cambie (Vancouver) Abbotsford 
Park Royal (West Vancouver) Fort Street (Victoria) 
Caulfeild (West Vancouver) Westshore (Langford) 
HighGate Village_(Burnaby) Columbia Place (Kamloops) 
Ironwood (Richmond) Penticton Plaza (Penticton) 
Westwood Centre (Port Coquitlam) Pine Centre (Prince George) 
Nicola Station (Port Coquitlam) Orchard Park (Kelowna) 
Meadowtown (Pitt Meadows) Mission Park (Kelowna) 
Fleetwood (Surrey) Vernon 
Nordel Crossing (Surrey) 
The cost of the new government Signature Liquor stores listed above in Table 1.3 is 
borne indirectly by the British Columbia Government. In a direct quote from the British 
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Columbia Government Liquor Stores 2005 2006 Annual Report "As the LDB expands 
the Signature Store program and re-invests in store renovations, system enhancement and 
improved customer service, annual capital expenditures will increase to $30 million from 
$10 million in the past fiscal year."73 The Canadian Taxpayer Federation is an avid critic 
of government liquor store expansion and store renovations as seen in their 2002 Report 
"Ending The Prohibition on Competition", Milke of the Taxpayers Federation states "the 
government can, just as it does now with sales tax, collect the revenue it desires while not 
paying the bill for the renovation of commercial retail stores."74 Private liquor stores 
operating in British Columbia do not have the luxury of renovating their existing liquor 
store and simply billing the government. More so, the application process to the Liquor 
Control and Licensing Branch as well as the municipal city councils could block 
expansion plans for private operators which do not occur for government liquor stores. 
CHAPTER SIX - Canadian Liquor Retailing Privatization Price Studies 
Policy reports and consumer advocate studies have compiled highlighting pnce 
discrepancies between public versus private liquor stores operating in British Columbia. 
The results are not surprising in that most studies conclude private retailers charge more 
than the government controlled stores. Private stores in British Columbia cannot operate 
on the small 13% margin currently in place resulting in private stores marking up prices 
to cover costs in order to make a profit. Several studies compare British Columbia's 
government liquor stores prices to those of private stores in Alberta which is one hundred 
73 British Columbia Liquor Distribution Branch. Annual Report 2005-2006. 
http: //www.bcliquorstores.com/pdf/ldb _ar05 _ 06.pdf (20 August 2007). 
74 Milke, "Ending the Prohibition on Competition", 2002, Pg. 29. 
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percent privatized. Of the studies reviewed, companng pnces between Alberta and 
British Columbia is undeterminable. Products can be more or less expensive depending 
on the city and the amount of competition. When reviewing price studies, some products 
are used as lost leaders at one store and not at the other, thus skewing results when 
comparing British Columbia and Alberta prices. A study conducted in 2003 by the 
Parkland Institute, comparing British Columbia and Alberta liquor prices used an average 
consumer's basket of goods. The basket consisted of one dozen beer from a high volume 
domestic producer, a 750ml bottle of rum, whiskey, and vodka, a 750ml bottle each of 
French red, German white, United States white, and Australian red wine. 75 The study 
found that the average cost of the basket of goods in Alberta was $184.92 versus $183.93 
in British Columbia. The survey further outlined the fluctuations in price that occur when 
comparing British Columbia and Alberta liquor prices. The study showed that the price of 
the same products in Alberta varied from $170.01 to $201.72. 76 Concerns have been 
raised that if British Columbia were to fully privatize liquor retailing there would be price 
discrimination between rural and urban centers. A 1994 report by the Department of 
Economics at York University found that "there is bound to be an urban-rural price 
differential under privatization which discriminates against consumers of the same 
product."77 However, as stated by the 2003 Parkland Institute study "there was no 
correlation between the basket cost and distance from an urban centre, nor was there any 
correlation with the basket cost and the number of close competitors stores."78 The 
75 Flanagan, "Sobering Result", 2003. Pg. 34. 
76 Flanagan, "Sobering Result", June 2003 , Pg. 34. 
77 
Jazairi, "Privatizing the Liquor Control Board of Ontario", 1994, Pg. 31. 
78 Flanagan, "Soberting Result", June 2003 , Pg. 34. 
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volatility of Alberta prices can give Alberta consumers extreme price advantages in some 
situations - if consumers are willing to invest in travel time and research. 
A further study by the Consumers Association of Canada in March of 2006 conducted a 
price study comparing 43 products in British Columbia alone. The study surveyed private 
liquor stores across large and small communities in British Columbia and compared 
private prices to government prices. The following municipalities were selected in Table 
1.3 below. 
Table 1.3- Selected Cities for Consumers Association of Canada Price Study March 2006 
Brentwood Bay Langford Princeton 
Burnaby Langley Richmond 
Chase Maple Ridge Saanichton 
Chemainus Mission Salmon Arm 
Chilliwack Nanaimo Sooke 
Cobble Hill New Westminster Summerland 
Colwood North Vancouver Surrey 
Coombs Parksville Vancouver 
Coquitlam Peachland Vernon 
Duncan Penticton Victoria 
Hope Port Alberni West Vancouver 
Kamloops Port Coquitlam 
The Consumer Association study used 43 products as comparisons. The study's key 
findings were that "the BC Government liquor store model has forced consumers to pay 
millions of dollars more per year at private liquor stores for beer, wine and liquor."79 
Figure 1.2 (pg.45) shows the British Columbia government liquor store prices versus the 
79 
"British Columbia's Liquor Distribution System: Does it work for consumers?", Consumer Association 
of Canada, March 2006, Pg. 6. http: //www.consumer.ca/pdfs/060314 _ cac _alcohol_ study.pdf. (20 
September 2006) 
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private stores lowest, median and highest price of the 43 products purchased during the 
2006 study. 
Figure 1.2- Consumer Association of Canada 2006 British Columbia Price Comparison Study: 
http://www.consumer.ca/pdfs/060314_cac_alcohol_study. pdf. September 20, 2006 
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The study further concluded that the current model for private liquor retailers is 
inadequate for making a reasonable rate of return. However, the inadequate profit under 
the current discount received forces private stores to increase their prices above British 
Columbia government liquor store price. 80 As a result prices must be higher for 
consumers shopping at private stores. Unlike many studies conducted to date the 2006 
Consumers Association study probed insight from private sector operators asking the 
question: "Under the current British Columbia system, how difficult is it to make an 
adequate profit?" Figure 1.4 shows the respondent ' s answers. Note: The study does not 
confirm how many private operators responded to the posed question. 
80 "Consumer Association of Canada", 2006. Pg. 8. 
45 
Figure I. 3 - Difficulty to for the Private Sector to Profit under Current B. C. Privatization 
http://www.consumer.ca/pdfs/060314_cac_alcohol_study.pdf. September 20, 2006. 
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The Consumer Association of Canada Study offers several valid conclusions but fails to 
offer any recommendations to remedy public and private retailing woes. They concluded 
that there is less product selection at private stores due to size constraints, the British 
Columbia government is forcing consumers to pay increased prices due to the current 
private liquor retailing model and British Columbia government stores prices are similar 
to the government of Ontario ' s prices. 81 
A study by the Canadian Taxpayers Federation in 2002 found similar findings to the 
Parkland Institutes 2003 study which found some products more expensive in Alberta 
while others were substantially cheaper than British Columbia. The Canadian Taxpayers 
Federation study used a comparison number of 1845 products between British Columbia 
government liquor stores and Alberta liquor stores. The Canadian Taxpayers study 
81 "Consumer Association of Canada", 2006, Pg. 15. 
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concluded that "82.6% of the products private stores surveyed were cheaper in Alberta 
while only 17.4% were less expensive in British Columbia."82 The study broke down the 
following categories and compared British Columbia price versus Alberta price: 
1. B. C. Wine - Out of 192 B. C. made wines, 48% could be purchased cheaper in 
Alberta, while only 52% were available for less in B.C. 
2. Foreign Wine - Out of 844 foreign bottles of wine, 93% were cheaper in 
Alberta, while only 7% were lower in B. C. 
3. Beer, Coolers, Cider - Out of 205 beer and cooler comparisons, 92.5% could 
be purchased cheaper in Alberta, 7. 5% were available at lower prices in B. C. 
4. Sparkling Wines - Out of 68 domestic and foreign bottles of champagne-style 
products, 90% were lower priced in Alberta while only 10% were lower priced in 
B.C. 
5. Spirits- Out of 536 types of spirits, 74% were lower priced in Alberta while 
26% were lower priced in B. C. 
In British Columbia private store operators are not allowed under the Liquor Control and 
Licensing Act to sell product below their cost. However, in Alberta, the use of lost 
leaders is prevalent. In British Columbia, uniform pricing exists at government liquor 
stores regardless of the location within the province. Private stores, on the other hand, 
may not sell product at or below government liquor stores prices in British Columbia. As 
a result of the "minimum mark-ups in effect at British Columbia Liquor Stores (and 
because of the lack of a truly competitive market for alcohol sales in British Columbia), 
sale prices, as regularly occur in Alberta, are less common in British Columbia and cause 
missed sales for B.C. consumers."83 Alberta liquor stores use all available means of 
advertising liquor products which includes print, television and radio to entice customers 
82 Milke, "Ending the Prohibition on Competition", 2002. Pg. 8. 
83 Milke, "Ending the Prohibition on Competition", 2002, Pg. 21 . 
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with weekly and daily specials. In British Columbia liquor advertising through the media 
is considered rare. 
A flyer in the Calgary Herald (Figure 1.4) dated April 6, 2007 shows examples of sale 
prices and loss leaders used to entice customers. 
Figure 1.4- Sample Alberta Advertising in the Calgary Herald (Friday Apri/6, 2007) 
The ongomg argument regarding price will continue to exist insofar as Alberta and 
British Columbia remain neighbours. In British Columbia price discrepancies will remain 
as long as British Columbia continues with a public and private liquor retailing model. As 
shown in the studies above almost all products purchased at private liquor retailers in 
British Columbia are higher priced than government controlled stores due to the high 
product costs private retailers must pay. In Alberta, products continue to fluctuate under 
free-market conditions resulting in some products being higher or lower priced than 
others depending on the store. Alberta, under privatization, has the advantage of chain 
stores such as Liquor Barn, Liquor Depot, Great Canadian Liquor Stores and Willow 
Park Liquor Stores which receive quantity discounts by bulk buying, thus reducing prices 
further for consumers. The Alberta example of privatization has been closely watched by 
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both its proponents and critics. To ultimately compare British Columbia' s outcome of full 
privatization to Alberta' s current model would be unfair. The Alberta government has 
vast rules and regulations concerning the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages just 
as British Columbia does at present. However, what we must consider is that British 
Columbia and Alberta' s tax system differs as well as its regulations and liquor laws. If 
British Columbia were to privatize all liquor stores the pricing outcome and level of free 
market competition is unknown due to political and municipal influence. 
CHAPTER SEV EN -Analysis 
The objective of this paper is to examme the social and economic effects of fully 
privatizing British Columbia's distribution of alcohol through its retail outlets. Given 
British Columbia's current fragmented public and private retail distribution model no 
in-depth studies or reports have been completed due to the changing nature of the Liquor 
Control and Distribution Branch of British Columbia. To compare British Columbia' s 
current public and private retail model to another province or state would be challenging 
due to the changing nature of British Columbia' s liquor retail and distribution system. 
In this literature review comparisons and critiques of various studies for and against 
privatization initiatives of liquor retailing were addressed. One can only apply inference 
as to the extent of the social and economic impacts public and private liquor retailing will 
leave on British Columbia. We cannot call British Columbia privatized even through 609 
private liquor stores exist. Nor can we call British Columbia' s liquor model "government 
controlled" due to fact that 200 government run retail locations exist. In essence, the 
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private stores are controlled by the Liquor Distribution Branch and the provmce of 
British Columbia, creating a huge divide between free market commerce in the private 
sector and tightly controlled government monopoly on the other end of the spectrum. The 
best example for comparing British Columbia's liquor distribution is the Alberta 
privatization process which occurred in 1993. The Alberta model is a reference point to 
possibly determine some of the social and economic effects that may result if British 
Columbia were to fully privatize or, alternatively, allow a more lax private market to co-
exist within the current government monopoly. 
The social and economic impacts are heavily weighted for or against privatization in all 
studies and reports reviewed in this paper. No study offers a compromising alternative for 
a public or private solution in which public enterprise and private business can co-exist at 
a retail level. The reason why British Columbia's current liquor retail model does not 
work for private liquor retailers is that the Liquor Distribution Branch does not have to 
adhere to the same regulations as the private sector retailers in regards to product cost and 
physical location. 84 
The social issues discussed in this paper are relevant issues that almost all studies 
conducted reviewed. The issues discussed in this paper include direct and indirect 
healthcare costs, increased store density, crime, impaired driving and government 
revenues. The majority of studies conducted by health advocacy groups, governments 
84 "Liquor Retailing In B.C. - Involvement of the Private Sector (2005)", British Columbia Chamber of 
Commerce. 
Np.http: //www.bcchamber.org/Policy _and _Positions/Provincial_ Policy_ Statements/Public_ Safety_ and_ Sol 
icitor _General/Liquor_ Retailing_ in_ BC.aspx (28 July 2007). 
50 
and unions rely on the potential negative social ramifications in order to dismiss the 
notion of any benefit to privatization. 
Studies not in favour of privatization determine that product selection would decrease and 
there would be an increase in price and a decrease in the level of service. The social 
ramifications would result in increased healthcare costs due to larger consumption and 
increased personal and property crime. Furthermore, issues such as price discrimination 
between rural and urban centers as well as decreased tax revenues would be used in 
favour to support the current government monopolies. 
For every social argument in favour of government liquor monopolies there are also 
counter arguments on the same issues that support privatization initiatives. Using Alberta 
as an example product selection increased in some circumstances and decreased in others. 
Private enterprise relies upon product niches and areas of specialization. If a private 
enterprise operator feels a particular location warrants a large or small selection of 
products based upon demographics then the operator reacts to consumer demand. The 
argument could be made that government controlled stores carry too much inventory that 
does not move thus creating holding costs and a waste of shelf space. The decrease in 
level of service argument could be offset again by the type of store the private operator 
wishes to operate - a low cost high volume store or a specialized service oriented store 
depending on demographics and income levels. The increases in the product price 
argument show that in some circumstances, under privatization, products are higher 
and/or lower than current government monopolies. Various pricing studies have been 
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conducted comparing private British Columbia stores to government stores as well as 
Alberta private stores to British Columbia government stores. When comparing British 
Columbia private stores to British Columbia government stores the prices in private 
stores are usually higher due to the uneven wholesale pricing and restrictions placed upon 
private operators in British Columbia. However, on average, when comparing privatized 
stores in Alberta versus the British Columbia government stores prices are fairly 
competitive. Alberta consumers see large price advantages as a result of specials and loss 
leaders - a direct benefit of having a competitive free market. 
The argument of increased healthcare costs under privatization is undeterminable. If you 
purchase alcohol from a government liquor store does that decrease your chances of the 
possibility of you requiring healthcare? The argument can be further extended to say that 
since you bought alcohol from a government retail store then the chances are less likely 
you will hurt yourself or someone else in an accident versus buying the alcohol from a 
private store. Valentin Petkantchin of the Montreal Economic Institute furthers this 
argument "that external costs exist only to the extent that the healthcare system is public 
in Canada."85 In retrospect, if healthcare was privatized and an individual caused serious 
self-inflicted harm through the abuse of alcohol and did not interfere and require publicly 
funded healthcare the social costs are negligible. If this individual caused social costs to 
society in the form of harming another individual or required government funded 
healthcare then social costs from liquor must be taken into consideration. What is 
determinable is that consumption does increase if liquor store density increases. The 
85 
Petkantchin. Montreal Economic Institute: Regulation Series. Pg. 14. October 2005 
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extent of healthcare costs associated with an increase in liquor stores in a community is 
undeterminable. In British Columbia it would be even harder to determine healthcare 
costs due to the current model of public and private liquor retailing. 
The notion that an increase in liquor stores in a community leads to a rise in personal and 
property crime has been a difficult argument for privatization studies to address. Studies 
conducted in Alberta concluded that an increase in robberies did occur with the rapid 
expansion of private stores in Calgary and Edmonton. This theory holds true for almost 
any retail store - the more gas stations or video stores a community has the larger the 
chance of a robbery occurring at a video store or gas station. If supporters of public 
enterprise feel that government liquor stores reduce crime should government take 
control of banks and jewelry stores since these businesses are particularly high robbery 
risks?86 
The argument that privatization diminishes government revenue is debatable given that a 
comparison of Alberta liquor revenue before and after privatization is undeterminable. In 
theory, if full privatization were to occur the government would receive the same tax 
revenue it currently receives as well as reducing the cost of leasing over two hundred 
high profile retail locations and eliminating high union salaries. However, according to 
the literature reviewed, the Alberta privatization example is inconclusive for showing if 
revenue would increase or decrease under privatization due to the Alberta government 
combining liquor revenue and gaming revenue together. It is believed that the same or 
greater tax revenue can be achieved through privatization without maintaining and 
86 West, "The Privatization of Liquor Retailing in Alberta", 2003 , Pg. 64. 
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running the physical retail locations. Furthermore, the argument that a loss of government 
revenue will occur due to privatization is hard to justify - should more British 
Columbians starting smoking, drinking and gambling in order to increase tax revenues? 
At the same time the government is complaining about healthcare costs due to alcohol 
and smoking related illnesses which are the direct result of legal products sold and 
regulated by the government that sells and condones these products at the same time. 
Impaired driving convictions are decreasing across the country. Studies related to 
impaired driving are unable to decipher as to where the alcohol was purchased and/or 
consumed. Impaired driving can result from alcoholic beverages being consumed at 
home, restaurants, pubs, bars, boating and golf courses. To correlate an increase in liquor 
stores to an increase in impaired driving would be meaningless considering all alcohol 
consumption is not a direct result of having an increase in liquor stores. The studies 
reviewed in this paper do not mention if increased awareness or enforcement of impaired 
driving has been a result of Canada's overall decline in impaired driving infractions. 
Recommendations 
British Columbia's liquor retail system has been evolving over the last twenty years and 
more so in the past five years. The current system at the retail level can be confusing for 
consumers. It is difficult to have a government monopoly competing with and controlling 
the private sector at the same time. The literature available to date does not offer concrete 
evidence that supports full privatization or full government control of liquor retailing in 
British Columbia. Comparing British Columbia's current retail model to Alberta's private 
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retail model is inconclusive. Valid arguments for privatization have been made in this 
paper which includes product cost, free market competition, product selection and 
convemence. However, valid arguments have also been made against privatization in 
British Columbia and Alberta which include undeterminable potential declines in liquor 
tax revenue, a decrease of products in smaller communities and undeterminable health 
and social costs. 
The reality of the British Columbia government privatizing liquor retailing entirely is 
very unlikely. In 2003 the Liberals decided to slow the privatization initiative and to date 
have only closed two dozen stores across the province. In the interim, since 2003 , the 
government has constructed twenty "big box" liquor stores called "Signature Stores". The 
unlikely event that full privatization in British Columbia will occur is evident by the 
construction of the twenty large "Signature Stores." One can only assume that the British 
Columbia government will continue its current public and private approach to liquor 
retailing while closing small revenue producing government stores and amalgamating 
these smaller stores in larger "Signature Stores". 
If the government continues its current approach to liquor retailing while allowing 
increased expansion, the private sector must receive some form of compensation to offset 
the financial costs incurred by the private sector entering the liquor retailing business. In 
March of 2002 the Liberal government solicited applications from the private sector due 
to the closing of British Columbia government liquor stores. Obviously, a complete 
change of plans has occurred since 2002 in which the number of private liquor stores has 
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been allowed to increase by almost three hundred percent and the expansiOn of 
consolidated government stores has occurred. To level the playing field and create a 
competitive market between public and private liquor stores, private stores must be 
allowed to purchase alcoholic beverages at the same wholesale price as government run 
stores. Government controlled stores will ultimately continue to dominate liquor retail 
purchases in British Columbia even if the same wholesale price discount is given to 
private stores due to the existing high profile locations the provincially controlled stores 
currently reside in. In addition to the already existing Class A retail space government 
controlled stores are located in, the size of provincially controlled stores are much larger 
than private stores due to government stores not having to abide by municipal by-laws 
which restrict the size of private stores. If restrictions on size and location of private 
stores were relaxed to allow private operators to compete with the government then 
private operators would at least have the chance to compete in a semi-monopolistic 
environment. However, if private stores were allowed to purchase alcohol at the same 
wholesale prices as the government, provincial liquor tax revenue would decline. 
Given the inconclusive evidence that a full public or private solution is the answer in 
British Columbia or, for that matter Alberta, the solution in British Columbia I believe 
will be to continue with the province 's current model of allowing public and private 
stores to co-exist. In my opinion it is unlikely that British Columbia private stores will 
receive compensation in the form of reduced product cost to level the playing field. 
Currently private stores receive a 13% discount of liquor purchased from the Liquor 
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Distribution Branch and any further discounts would start further reducing government 
revenue. 
As seen from the privatization studies and policy reports reviewed in this paper each 
argument has its strengths and weaknesses. The British Columbia government, in my 
opinion, is trying to appease the private sector by allowing expansion of private stores 
while at the same time allowing the British Columbia Government Employees Union to 
maintain jobs. 
The consumers of British Columbia need to be made aware of the differences between 
public and private liquor stores within the province. Consumers need to understand that 
private stores are a direct result of the government' s decision in 2003 to privatize liquor 
stores. This decision was later semi- abandoned. Today, privatized stores have to charge 
increased markups due to an uneven playing field set by the provincial government. In 
most circumstances, private liquor stores in British Columbia are disadvantaged due to 
limited product selection from size constraints which are a direct result of municipal by-
laws limiting liquor store size and location. On the positive side consumers are rewarded 
by private liquor stores offering convenience, extended hours and chilled products. 
Ultimately, if the British Columbia government were to abolish its monopoly of British 
Columbia liquor retailing and allow the private sector to compete in a free market, British 
Columbia consumers may be better off in urban areas in regards to product selection and 
availability. However, all other benefits of privatization are questionable and can be 
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challenged for and against privatization. The British Columbia Liquor Distribution 
Branch could learn a lot from the Alberta example of what not to do if full privatization 
does occur. The Alberta privatization initiative allowed unlimited liquor stores in 
communities and extended hours of operation until 2 am. Some British Columbia 
municipalities have allowed multiple liquor stores within blocks of each other, while 
other cities have limited access and availability to liquor retail outlets. If privatization 
were to occur in British Columbia consumers would have a greater number of liquor 
stores providing easier access, convenience and variable pricing. This does not mean the 
consumer is forced to buy products from a store that sells products at higher prices - it is 
the consumer' s responsibility to determine factors such as convenience, price, location 
and parking when deciding to purchase products from a particular store as is the case in 
Alberta. As consumers we understand that prices will vary from one store to another. We 
do not expect nor would we want government control over all goods and services that we, 
as a society consume. However, the repercussion and effects of alcohol are too large to 
allow privatization to exist in British Columbia if the full financial and social effects are 
currently undeterminable. 
The study of British Columbia's liquor retail distribution model is an ongoing process 
which has to be monitored and studied overtime if concrete recommendations and 
conclusions are to be drawn. Currently, British Columbia' s retail model is fragmented 
between public and private and both are enduring stages of transition as a result of 
provincially dictated mandates. We can only infer that the social and economic impacts 
other provinces have endured under liquor privatization will occur in British Columbia. 
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However, British Columbia is unique in that public and private retailers currently co-
existing in a transition stage that has no clear timeline or direction. It is this co-existence 
of public and private enterprise which makes the conclusions and recommendations 
unique -we cannot determine if increases in crime, alcohol abuse and impaired driving 
are a direct result from an increase in privately run stores or an increase in the expansion 
of government run stores. What can be determined is that British Columbia' s tax 
revenues from the sale of alcoholic beverages are on the rise. 
Originally this project was to determine the social and economic impacts m British 
Columbia if the government were to adopt the privatization initiative planned for 2002. 
As this paper progressed and the literature review expanded the study and my area of 
interest shifted to reasons why the British Columbia government was still involved in the 
liquor retail industry. The Alberta example of liquor privatization provided the grounds 
for the notion that a government liquor monopoly is unnecessary to provide the public 
with a product and service that can be handled by the private sector. The public sector 
and the policy reports that support the government monopoly have arguments relating to 
the health, safety and tax revenue of the province. These health, safety and financial 
arguments can easily be credited and discredited for and against public or private liquor 
retailing. Comparing British Columbia to Alberta provides some compelling arguments 
for privatization for the end consumer, but falls short in determining the total costs to 
society that are a direct result of increasing liquor stores in every community. 
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This project has provided the opportunity to review both public and private liquor 
retailing extensively in Alberta and British Columbia. The project has highlighted the 
need for direction and guidance from the provincial government. Changes to liquor 
retailing are evident in British Columbia as shown by the increase in private stores and 
the increase of mega government liquor stores. What we cannot determine is what 
direction the provincial government is taking and what political influences, union 
lobbying and private sector political donations will influence the next stages of liquor 
retailing within British Columbia. 
Further research is needed to determine the effects of British Columbia's public and 
private liquor retailing model. An area of study in which I am interested in furthering 
research is the difference in consumption and buying patterns between government and 
private liquor stores in British Columbia. What is undeterminable is the consumption that 
occurs as a result of the lower prices charged by government stores versus higher prices 
charged by private stores. 
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